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Holzer, Harold Lincoln President-Elect: Abraham Lincoln and the Great
Secession Winter, 1860-1861. Simon & Schuster, $30.00 hardcover ISBN
9780743289474
Lincoln Before the Inauguration
Harold Holzer has authored or edited some thirty books on Abraham
Lincoln, among them one previous monograph, Lincoln at Cooper Union (2004),
a widely hailed account of the critical 1860 “speech that made Abraham Lincoln
president." His follow-up, Lincoln: President-Elect, is rich with discerning
rhetorical analysis and a knack for personalizing Lincoln through revealing
anecdotes. It is, however, limited by its narrow focus on Lincoln himself – from
a failure to consider his words and actions within the context of the complex
events of the secession crisis.
The great strength of this work is its portrayal – perhaps the most complete
of any account written of any period in Lincoln’s life – of the daily flow of the
President-elect’s life through the agonizing secession winter. Indeed, Holzer is at
his best in those sections of the narrative that move literally day by day. If at
times the detail appears gratuitous (Seven pages on Lincoln’s decision to grow a
beard? Twenty pages on his preparations to leave Springfield for Washington?),
at other times his vibrant descriptions of the daily grind make the pages fly,
carrying the fascinated reader along almost breathlessly. No other writer has
captured so vividly the pageantry and chaos, the grueling schedule and
unrelenting strain of Lincoln’s long, roundabout journey to the capital. Nor has
any other historian of the secession crisis presented a more authentic picture of
the ubiquitous crush of office-seekers that dogged the President-elect’s every
move. Such descriptions not only make Lincoln and his world more real but also
provide a powerful portrait of some significant but often overlooked aspects of
Lincoln’s efforts to deal with secession. Holzer also contributes outstanding
rhetorical analyses of some of Lincoln’s less noticed speeches, including notes
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and fragments of speeches never delivered. The author’s discussion of the
undated apple-of-gold-in-a-picture-of-silver fragment is particularly thoughtful,
and thought-provoking. He also makes a strong case for the eloquence and
significance of Lincoln’s generally overlooked farewell speech of February 11,
and uses the post-delivery improvements upon that address as an insightful
model for the President-elect’s facility in revision.
At times, though, Holzer’s rhetorical analysis is frustratingly indistinct. This
is particularly true of his descriptions of Lincoln’s numerous little speeches
along the route from Springfield to Washington. Although the author usefully
points out an improvement in the speeches’ smoothness and ideological
sophistication as Lincoln moved east, his minimalist commentary leaves the
reader uncertain of how he reads either their message or their importance.
Exacerbating this are inconsistencies in his presentation. Regarding Lincoln’s
repeated dismissal of the crisis as artificial and his startling challenges to
secessionists, Holzer variously blames the President-elect’s weariness; attributes
the “gaffe" to an “unfortunate" decision to speak extemporaneously (319);
praises Lincoln’s self-confidence; and describes him as “perhaps a bit out of
touch" (329). Twice he quotes such passages with no comment whatever. To
Lincoln’s most vigorous anti-secession statement, his “iron-fisted" threat to put
the foot down firmly against secession, Holzer notes with open admiration a
refusal to recognize “that illegitimate event." Missing is any recognition that
Lincoln’s firm and very public antisecession message was consistent and clearly
deliberate.
This might be nitpicking if not for the importance of the topic. Given
Lincoln’s public silence to that point in the crisis, the nation was closely
observing his words, particularly about secession. Thus Holzer’s off-handed
treatment of Lincoln’s hardline statements is significant. In fact, the
contradictions among his analyses of these speeches stems from a much larger
problem: the book’s often conspicuous absence of historical context. One
hesitates to criticize a book an author did not write, and Holzer’s concern in this
work is plainly with Lincoln, not the secession crisis. But at several points, some
of them crucial, his assessments and even descriptions of Lincoln’s words and
decisions are weakened by a failure to consider the events that were shaping
them. The inaugural-journey speeches are a case in point. As Lincoln was
drafting his stern first inaugural draft and journeying to Washington, two major
developments influenced his outlook: a reinvigorated spirit of compromise
among Northerners, including several Republican congressmen, in the wake of a
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near-conflict in Charleston harbor, and a series of antisecession votes in the
Upper South. Alarmed by the one and emboldened by the other, Lincoln wished
to boost the spirits of demoralized Republicans and now felt confident enough in
Southern unionism to do so. By neglecting to discuss congressional compromise
negotiations, the battle over secession in the Upper South, and Northern public
opinion in general, Holzer isolates Lincoln from the events to which he was
responding. It is perhaps inevitable that he is uncertain how to evaluate the
secession-related speeches.
The inattention to compromise results in a misrepresentation of its basic
issues. On page 252, for example, Holzer expresses surprise that in early
February Lincoln grudgingly okayed the Republican proposal to admit New
Mexico to statehood under popular sovereignty, a plan which Holzer claims
“embraced nearly all of the key Southern demands," so long as no further
extension of slavery was permitted. In reality, this proposal came nowhere near
meeting key Southern demands, which included acknowledgment of the Dred
Scott doctrine that Congress could not ban slave from the territories, a federal
slave code to protect slavery in the territories, and the very right to extend
slavery into future territories that Lincoln rejected; its acknowledged purpose, in
fact, was to divide Southern radicals and conservatives. Thus Lincoln’s
acquiescence, reluctant though it was, was in keeping with his unfailing rebuff of
substantive compromise. Nor, in the context of impending Upper South
secession elections – virtually absent in Holzer’s discussion – was it very
surprising.
Exacerbating this confusion, the author views the crisis from the perspective
of the hardline Republicans. To those who favored compromise in 1860-61, the
hardliners were war-mongering zealots blindly marching the country into
destruction. To hardliners, on the other hand, compromise was a sell-out and
conciliationists’ honor and courage suspect. Eschewing scholarly distance,
Holzer rebukes the compromise movement as – per his closing analysis on page
458 – “unprincipled." Thus on page 130 he find it “astonishing" that James
Buchanan would offer the South concessions in his Annual Message, when in
fact this attitude was perfectly reasonable given that Buchanan, like most
Democrats, blamed the crisis on fanatical antislavery agitation. It is
“inexplicable," Holzer writes on page 275, that former Whig president Millard
Fillmore would call for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law in late
January, when throughout the crisis even hardliners such as Salmon Chase and
Gideon Welles – and Lincoln – agreed on the need for enforcement. As early as
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2009

3

Civil War Book Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 9

mid-November old-line Whigs had gone beyond that and made repeal of
Northern personal liberty laws a centerpiece of their procompromise campaign –
at around the same time that it was first advocated by Republican moderates
such as the New York Times’ Henry Raymond. A final example: on page 217,
Holzer characterizes as “rebellious" a December mass meeting of some two
thousand New York businessmen, concerned for the future of their country,
frightened about a severe and worsening financial panic (which the author never
mentions, despite quoting several references to it), and calling on Southerners to
remain calm and on Congress to find a diplomatic solution.
There are other problems as well. In explaining Lincoln’s opposition to
compromise, Holzer focuses almost entirely on the President-elect’s antislavery
principles despite the President-elect’s few references to slavery during the
crisis. Lincoln’s preoccupation with the danger that a postelection compromise
posed to constitutional government receives little attention and no substantive
analysis even though it comprises most of the anticompromise sentiments
actually quoted in the book. In addition, Holzer’s remarkably comprehensive
primary-source research appears to come at the expense of the secondary
literature: his analysis shows few signs of either the influence of or
argumentation against the classic works of David Potter, Kenneth Stampp, or
William E. Baringer, and no indication at all of having read Daniel Crofts’s
seminal Reluctant Confederates, one of the most important works ever published
on Lincoln during the crisis. Finally, the author’s methodology frequently
reflects the unfortunate recent trend in Lincoln studies of accepting uncritically
the claims of long-after-the-fact reminiscences. Holzer makes regular use of
recollections not published until the twentieth century, as well as such
notoriously unreliable memoirists as Ward Hill Lamon, Lucius Chittenden, and
even the anonymous Public Man, whose concocted “diary" the author on page
398 labels “incisive."
Holzer’s achievement in Lincoln President-Elect is most impressive.
Current readers come away from his narrative with a profoundly immediate,
almost palpable, sense of Lincoln, while future historians will mine the book’s
wealth of telling anecdotes and hard-to-find details. Had the author been more
sensitive to the underlying context of the events he describes, his
accomplishment would be formidable indeed.
Russell McClintock is the author of Lincoln and the Decision for War: The
Northern Response to Secession (University of North Carolina Press, 2008). He
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teaches at St. John’s High School in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts.
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